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DOMA AND PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION:
INTERPRETING AND ENFORCING
FEDERAL LAW
Joseph Landau*
By creating a federal definition of “marriage,” the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) denies married same-sex couples more than 1,000 benefits
under federal law. But DOMA does not prevent the federal government
from granting benefits to same-sex couples under all circumstances. By
interpreting laws other than DOMA, the Obama Administration has
extended domestic partner benefits to married and unmarried same-sex
couples in areas such as employment, housing, and health care. Moreover,
in the unique context of immigration law, the Obama Administration has
exercised prosecutorial discretion to prevent the foreign-born spouses and
partners of U.S. citizens from facing removal from the United States. By
exercising discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of federal law,
the Administration serves its twin obligations of promoting equal protection
while faithfully executing the laws—including complying with DOMA.
These features of executive discretion highlight the President’s broader role
in a conversation with the coordinate branches on questions of
constitutional meaning.
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INTRODUCTION
The Defense of Marriage Act1 (DOMA) became law in 1996 but had
little practical impact until equal marriage rights for same-sex couples
became a reality. Currently, a small but growing number of U.S.2 and
foreign3 jurisdictions permit marriage between same-sex couples, and
1. Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28
U.S.C. § 1783C (2006)).
2. In the United States, six states—Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, and Vermont—and the District of Columbia recognize the right of same-sex
couples to marry. In California, 18,000 same-sex couples were married between June 16,
2008 (when a state supreme court ruling invalidating a statute denying same-sex couples the
freedom to marry went into effect, see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008)),
and November 5, 2008 (when Proposition 8, an amendment to the California Constitution
that limited marriages to different-sex couples, took effect, see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5). See
Jesse McKinley, Same-Sex Married Couples in California Await Court’s Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2009, at A10. Since then, the California Supreme Court has held that
Proposition 8 did not nullify those marriages. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 119–22
(Cal. 2009). In 2012, three states—New Jersey, Washington State, and Maryland—passed
laws providing same-sex couples the right to marry. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
vetoed New Jersey’s bill, and while the governors of the other two states signed their states’
respective bills, both laws face a referendum in the November 2012 elections (which will
take place after publication of this Article).
3. Eleven foreign countries—Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden—permit marriage between
same sex couples. See CÓDIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 26.618 (Arg.); CODE
CIVIL [C.CIV.] art. 143 (Belg.); Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (Can.); Hjúskaparlögum
[Marriage Code], no. 31/1993 (as amended in 138th Congress, Law no. 65 (June 22, 2010))
(Ice.); Wet Openstelling Huwelijk (Act on the Opening Up of Marriage), Stb. 2001, p. 9
(Neth.); CIV. CODE, § 33 (enacted June 27, 2008) (Nor.); Assembleia da República, n. 9/2010
(May 31, 2010) (Port.); C.C., art. 44 (as amended by law 13/2005, July 1, 2005) (Spain);
ÄKTENSKAPSBALK [ÄKTB][MARRIAGE CODE] 2009:260 (Swed.); Minister of Home Affairs v.
Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 56–62 paras. 90–98 (S. Afr.).
In addition, same-sex couples can legally marry in the federal district of Mexico.
Código Civil Para el Distrito Federal [Civil Code for the Federal District], as amended, Lib.
Primero De Las Personas, tit. 5, cap. II, art. 146 (Mex.). The Supreme Court of Mexico has
held that these marriages must be recognized throughout Mexico. David Agren, Court Says
All Mexican States Must Honor Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A6. In
Brazil, the Supreme Federal Court voted to grant same-sex couples the same legal rights as
unmarried different-sex couples living in “stable unions” (which, in Brazil, essentially refers
to the same thing as de facto cohabitation, without registration), and couples living in “stable
unions” may petition a judge to convert their union into a marriage. See Sueann Caulfield,
The Recent Supreme Court Ruling on Same-Sex Unions in Brazil: A Historical Perspective,
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section 3 of DOMA4 prevents thousands of couples with valid marriages
from receiving any of the more than 1,000 privileges the federal
government provides married couples under tax, pension, Medicare, and
Social Security benefit programs.5
This Article considers the relationship between the role of executive
branch discretion and the Obama Administration’s policy to enforce, but
not defend in court, section 3 of DOMA. It identifies two different kinds of
discretion—interpretive discretion and enforcement discretion—under
which federal administrative agencies interpret or enforce laws other than
DOMA to extend benefits to same-sex couples (in certain circumstances) or
to protect them from harm (in others). Then, it discusses the function of
executive discretion in light of the congressional mandate set forth in
DOMA section 3 and the President’s understanding of his dual obligations
to equal protection and the faithful execution of the laws.
Part I details the Obama Administration’s interpretation of DOMA
section 3, including its decision to enforce the law but not defend it in
court.6 The Administration has advanced the argument that DOMA section
3, as applied to same-sex couples with valid marriages, is unconstitutional,
and that all forms of sexual-orientation discrimination, including but not
limited to laws restricting marriage rights, should be subjected to
heightened judicial scrutiny. These constitutional arguments intersect with
executive branch discretion in different ways.
Part II discusses interpretive discretion.
Although the federal
government cannot grant marriage-based benefits either to married samesex couples (because of DOMA) or same-sex couples in civil unions or
other non-marital relationships (because they are not married),7 it currently

1 UNIV. MICH. INT’L INST. 7 (2011), available at http://www.lsa.umich.edu/UMICH/
ii/Home/II%20Journal/Documents/2011fall_iijournal_article3.pdf; Iuri Dantas, Brazil Court
Grants Gay Couples Same Rights as Heterosexuals, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-05/brazil-court-grants-gay-couples-same-rightsas-heterosexuals-1-.html.
4. Section 3 of DOMA defines marriage as “a legal union between one man and one
woman” and reserves “the word ‘spouse’ . . . only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.” See Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). It applies that
definition to “the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States.” Id.
5. The federal government estimates that there are 1,138 rights and benefits that federal
law makes available to married couples. See U.S. Gov. Accountability Office, GAO-04353R Defense of Marriage Act (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04353r.pdf; see also, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379
(D. Mass. 2010).
6. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
7. In addition to the six states and the District of Columbia that recognize the right of
same-sex couples to marry, see supra note 2, thirteen other states provide civil union,
domestic partnership, or other forms of relationship protections. Nine of those thirteen states
have broad domestic partnership or civil union laws, and an additional four have more
limited forms of domestic partnership. See, e.g., Where State Laws Stand,
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provides various relationship benefits to same-sex couples regardless of
marital status. Section A discusses administrative rulemaking, where the
administrative arms of the executive branch have extended domesticpartnership benefits to same-sex couples in contexts such as employment,
housing, health care, and immigration. Section B discusses the relationship
between these acts of interpretive discretion and the Obama
Administration’s constitutional interpretation of DOMA.
Part III discusses enforcement discretion by using as a case study
immigration law, a context in which countless gay and lesbian foreign
nationals are barred from acquiring the family-based immigration benefits
they would ordinarily receive if the federal government recognized their
marriage to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR). Section A
details the range of critical family-based immigration benefits under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that, owing to DOMA section 3,
same-sex married couples cannot receive. However, as Section B explains,
government officials within two different agencies are using their discretion
to spare many binational same-sex couples some of the most punishing
consequences wrought by DOMA. Specifically, immigration officials are
granting favorable exercises of discretion to the foreign-born partners and
spouses of U.S. citizens and LPRs, preventing them from facing removal
from the United States. Section C discusses the relationship between
enforcement discretion and the Obama Administration’s constitutional
interpretation of DOMA.
Part IV considers ways that interpretive and enforcement discretion
highlight the executive’s broader role in a conversation with the coordinate
branches on questions of constitutional meaning, as well as questions
regarding the relationship between executive branch constitutional
interpretation and legislative change. While it is beyond the scope of this
Article to provide a comprehensive treatment of these broader questions,
the discussion lays a foundation for future work.
I. THE PRESIDENT AND DOMA
On February 23, 2011, the Obama Administration announced that it
would no longer defend the constitutionality of DOMA section 3, which
defines marriage for federal purposes as the union between one man and
one woman.8 The Administration had originally defended the statute, but in
a letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to House Speaker John Boehner
(the “Holder letter”), Holder explained that the Administration was
abandoning its defense of DOMA in light of new litigation brought within
the Second Circuit that raised fresh opportunities to examine the issue of
the proper level of constitutional scrutiny for sexual-orientation-based
FREEDOMTOMARRY.ORG, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand (last
visited Oct. 20, 2012).
8. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives, supra note 6.
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classifications.9 The Obama Administration explained that it had come to
view all laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation as warranting
heightened scrutiny, and that DOMA section 3, as applied to same-sex
couples, could not meet that standard.10 Although the Administration
would no longer defend the statute, it would “continue to comply with
Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the executive’s obligation to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and until Congress repeals
Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law’s
constitutionality.”11
The Holder letter argues that DOMA section 3, as applied to same-sex
couples with valid marriages, violates equal protection.12 Moreover, it
states that all laws (not just DOMA) that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation should be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny.13 This latter
argument, if accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court, could have sweeping
implications for equal marriage rights throughout the fifty states. Under a
heightened-scrutiny regime, conceivably all of the state statutes and
constitutional amendments prohibiting marriage between same-sex couples
would be subject to invalidation.14 Hence, if the argument for heightened
scrutiny that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has advanced in litigation
were to prevail in the Supreme Court,15 it is likely that couples within all
fifty states would be able to invoke that ruling to secure the freedom to
marry. By contrast, were the Supreme Court to invalidate DOMA section 3
under a lesser standard (such as rational basis review), the impact, though
significant, would most certainly be far less dramatic (at least in the
immediate term) than a ruling requiring heightened scrutiny.16 Rational
9. See id. On October 18, 2012, the Second Circuit became the first federal court of
appeals to apply heightened scrutiny to the context of LGBT rights, invalidating DOMA
section 3 on the grounds that it could not satisfy that standard of review. Windsor v. United
States, Nos. 12-2335-cv(L), 12-2435(Con.), 2012 WL 4937310, at *10–13 (2d Cir. Oct. 18,
2012), aff’g 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed,
No. 12-63 (U.S. July 16, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-307 (U.S.
Sept. 11, 2012).
10. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House
of Representatives, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. For a list of state constitutional amendments and state laws restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples or barring all forms of same-sex relationships from receiving state
recognition, see Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOMTOMARRY.ORG., http://www.freedom
tomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
15. See generally, e.g., Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal
Defendants, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214) (championing heightened scrutiny for all laws
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to
Motions to Dismiss, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (No. C3:10-00257-JSW) (same).
16. It is also noteworthy that many of the plaintiffs in the DOMA litigation, and their
attorneys, have challenged DOMA section 3 as applied to the facts and contexts raised in
their complaints, rather than challenging DOMA section 3 on its face. See Golinski v. U.S.
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basis could be applied by courts to invalidate state statutes and
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex couples form marrying,
but that outcome is more likely under heightened scrutiny.
II. DOMA AND INTERPRETATIVE DISCRETION
DOMA section 3 plainly bars married same-sex couples from having
their relationships treated as a marriage under federal law. It states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.17

While this statutory language applies to all references to the words
“marriage” and “spouse” in acts of Congress or in rulings, regulations, or
interpretations by federal bureaus and agencies, it does not prevent the
federal government from interpreting laws other than DOMA to extend
many non-marriage-based federal benefits to same-sex couples.
A. DOMA and Federal Benefits
Where DOMA does not apply, the administrative arms of the executive
branch can, and have, extended numerous benefits to same-sex couples,
irrespective of whether those couples are eligible to marry or have chosen to
do so. These initiatives, which assiduously avoid the nomenclature of
“marriage” (employing words like “partner” or “family” instead), are
consistent with the Obama Administration’s policy of complying with
DOMA unless and until it is subject to judicial invalidation or a legislative
repeal.
In 2009, for example, President Obama issued a memorandum to the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management and the Secretary of State,
directing each to find ways, consistent with DOMA, to expand benefits for
the same-sex partners of foreign-service and executive branch government
employees.18 The 2009 Obama memorandum led to a broad expansion of
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“These motions compel
the Court to determine whether the Defense of Marriage Act . . . as applied to Ms. Golinski,
violates the United States Constitution”); Complaint at 4, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
No. 3:10-cv-01750-VLB (D. Conn. July 31, 2012) (alleging that “DOMA, . . . as applied to
the plaintiffs, violates the United States Constitution”); Complaint at 21, Windsor v. United
States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10 CV 8435) (“[T]he plaintiff prays that
this Court [d]eclare DOMA . . . unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff.”). Under that
approach, a court invalidating DOMA section 3 could conceivably limit its holding to the
plaintiff couples or particular federal benefits at issue, leaving unaddressed the validity of
section 3 in other contexts. By contrast, a ruling striking down DOMA based on heightened
scrutiny would likely require a court to invalidate section 3 in its entirety.
17. Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
18. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Federal
Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,393 (June 17, 2009).
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various employment-based benefits for the same-sex domestic partners of
federal employees and, in some cases, to the children of same-sex domestic
partners of federal employees.19 The State Department also extended to the
same-sex domestic partners of foreign-service employees a range of
additional benefits such as diplomatic passports, training, medical care, and
family-member preferences for employment at posts abroad.20
The Obama Administration has expanded relationship benefits for samesex couples in a number of other contexts as well.21 On April 15, 2010, the
President directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
enhance hospital visitation rights for same-sex couples by requiring
hospitals that receive Medicare and Medicaid funds to allow patients to
designate visitors and surrogates (including same-sex partners) to make
critical medical decisions on their behalf.22 Subsequently, the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), a sub-agency of HHS, proposed
regulations expanding the list of potential visitors to include “a spouse, a
domestic partner (including a same-sex domestic partner), another family
member, or a friend.”23 On April 27, 2010, the Obama Administration
19. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Extension
of Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of Federal Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,247
(June 2, 2010). The memorandum states that: (1) the children of same-sex partners fall
within the definition of “child” for federal child care subsidies; (2) same-sex domestic
partners qualify as “family members” under employee assistance programs and other
programs; (3) a same-sex partner of a federal retiree can receive annuities upon the death of
the federal retiree; (4) employees’ same-sex partners and children are dependents for
purposes of evacuation payments; and (5) federal employees can receive unpaid leave in
order to meet the needs of their same-sex partners or the children of their same-sex partner.
See id.
20. See Press Release, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Benefits for Same-Sex
Domestic Partners of Foreign Service Employees (June 18, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/06/125083.htm.
The Department of State
implemented this policy by changing the Foreign Affairs Manual (guidance followed by U.S.
consulates around the world) so that same-sex domestic partners would qualify as “eligible
family members” with respect to benefits and allowances. See 14 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 511.3 (2012).
21. These policies have yet to receive much treatment in the academic literature. For
one noteworthy exception, see Mathew S. Nosanchuk, The Endurance Test: Executive
Power and the Civil Rights of LGBT Americans, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 440, 445, 456–57
(2012) (cataloguing various Obama Administration initiatives that promote LGBT equality).
22. See Memorandum for the Secretary of Health and Human Services on Respecting
the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate Surrogate Decision
Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511 (Apr. 15, 2010); Chris Johnson,
Obama Mandates Hospital Rights for LGBT Couples, WASH. BLADE (Apr. 16, 2010),
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2010/04/16/obama-memo-mandates-hospital-rights-forlgbt-couples/; see also Michael D. Shear, WASH. POST, Visiting Rights Given to Gays, Apr.
16, 2012, at A1.
23. Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Changes to the Hospital and Critical Access
Hospital Conditions of Participation To Ensure Visitation Rights for All Patients, 75 Fed.
Reg. 70,831–32 (proposed Nov. 19, 2010). Separately, CMS suggested that states should
extend to same-sex spouses and domestic partners important Medicaid benefits (including
the protection of the couple’s combined resources when one partner moves into an institution
for long-term care, as well as exemptions from state-imposed liens or the state’s pursuit of
estate recovery against beneficiaries) even though such benefits “cannot be directly applied
to same-sex spouses or partners as a result of DOMA.” Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr.
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expanded its interpretation of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
to apply to cases of same-sex gender-motivated violence.24 While the DOJ
recognized that the word “spouse” was specifically included among the list
of possible victims covered by VAWA, it also noted the presence of other,
marriage-neutral terms in the statute, such as “intimate partner,” “dating
partner,” and “another person,” all of which could be extended to cases in
which offenders and victims are of the same sex.25 On June 22, 2010, the
U.S. Department of Labor issued a ruling allowing same-sex couples with
children to take leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
regardless of whether the state or the employer recognized that parent-child
relationship.26 Finally, on March 5, 2012, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) issued a rule broadening the definition of
“family” in HUD’s core housing programs to ensure that individuals are not
excluded on the basis of sexual orientation or because they are in “an LGBT
relationship.”27
Presidential administrations have provided these family-based benefits in
the immigration context as well. One recent development concerns
proposed regulations that would allow same-sex couples to file a single

for Medicaid, CHIP and Survey & Certification, to State Medicaid Dirs. (June 10, 2011),
available at http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Same-SexPartners-SMD-6-10-11-2.pdf.
24. Charlie Savage, Gay Couples Gain Under Violence Against Women Act, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 2010, at A18.
25. Whether the Criminal Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act Apply to
Otherwise Covered Conduct When the Offender and the Victim are the Same Sex,
Memorandum Op. for the Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., 34 Op. O.L.C. 1, 3–6 (2010).
26. Administrator’s Interpretation, No. 2010-3 (Dep’t of Labor June 22, 2010), available
at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FMLA/2010/FMLAAI2010_3.htm. As
the news release accompanying the interpretation explained, “All families, including LGBT
families, are protected by the FMLA.” See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Labor, U.S.
Department of Labor Clarifies FMLA Definition of “Son and Daughter” (June 22, 2010),
available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/WHD/WHD20100877.htm; see Robert
Pear, Gay Workers Will Get Time to Care for Partner’s Sick Child, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2010, at A13.
27. Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or
Gender Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. 5662, 5664 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5,
200, 203, 236, 400, 570, 574, 882, 891, 982). The rule requires owners and operators of
HUD-assisted facilities to make housing available without regard to sexual orientation or
gender identity; prohibits lenders from using sexual orientation or gender identity as a basis
to determine a borrower’s eligibility for FHA-insured mortgage financing; and clarifies that
all otherwise eligible families cannot be excluded from participating in HUD programs. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., HUD Secretary Donovan Announces
New Regulations to Ensure Equal Access to Housing for All Americans Regardless of
Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2012/HUDNo.12-014;
HUD
Announces New LGBT Regulations, HOUS. AGENT MAG. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://houston
agentmagazine.com/hud-announces-new-lgbt-regulations/. The announced rule followed a
January 24, 2011, proposed rule, which cited evidence that LGBT individuals and families
were unfairly and arbitrarily excluded from housing opportunities in the private sector. See
Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs—Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender
Identity, 76 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4194 (proposed Jan. 24, 2011).
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customs declaration form when returning from travel abroad.28 Another
important immigration-related benefit, which predates the Obama
Administration, concerns the ability of the same-sex spouse or partner of a
nonimmigrant—a foreign national who comes to the U.S. temporarily for a
specific purpose (such as a foreign government official, student, or
temporary worker)—to accompany the nonimmigrant to the United States.
Since 1993, the executive branch has permitted the gay and lesbian partners
of nonimmigrants to apply for a visitor’s visa that allows them to
accompany their same-sex partner to the United States.29 In 2011, the
Obama Administration issued a memorandum to facilitate the process of
extending a partner’s status.30
B. Interpretive Discretion and Constitutional Commands
While these domestic-partner benefits address some of the inequities
resulting from DOMA, they fall far short of providing married same-sex
couples the litany of federal protections that are specifically tied to
marriage.31 Yet, because both married and unmarried same-sex couples can
take advantage of the benefits made possible through interpretive discretion,
these policies apply to all eligible same-sex couples throughout the fifty
states.32 Hence, even in a post-DOMA world—in which a couple’s
28. On March 27, 2012, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, a division of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), announced that it would broaden the definition of
family to include “two adult individuals in a committed relationship wherein the partners
share financial assets and obligations, and are not married to, or a partner of, anyone else,
including, but not limited to, long-time companions, and couples in civil unions or domestic
partnerships.” 77 Fed. Reg. 18,143, 18,144 (Mar. 27, 2012). The proposed change was
intended to “more accurately reflect relationships between members of the public who are
traveling together as a family.” Id.
29. See B-2 Visa Available for Non-Spouse, Same-Sex Partner of L-1, INS Says,
INTERPRETER RELEASES, Mar. 29, 1993, at 421–22; see also 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL § 41.31, N14.4 (2002); Telegram from Colin Powell, Sec’y of State, Dep’t
of State, to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, Re: B 2 Classification for Cohabitating
Partners (July 1, 2001), available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams_
1414.html.
30. Although applicants can seek extensions in increments of six months from DHS for
as long as the principal continues to maintain his or her nonimmigrant status, see 8 C.F.R. §
214.2 (2011), such extensions were often difficult to obtain. Beginning in 2011, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services issued a memorandum advising enforcers to consider
a nonimmigrant’s cohabitating partnership as a “favorable factor” when granting extensions
of the visitor’s status. See Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs.,
Dep’t Homeland Sec., Changes to B-2 Status and Extensions of B-2 Status for Cohabitating
Partners and Other Nonimmigrant Household Members (Aug. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2011/August/Cohabitating_Partners_PM_08
1711.pdf (“When evaluating an application for change to or extension of B-2 status based on
cohabitation, the cohabitating partner’s relationship to the nonimmigrant principal alien in
another status will be considered a favorable factor in allowing the household member to
obtain or remain eligible for B-2 classification.”).
31. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32. Some of these benefits apply only to same-sex couples, while others apply to
different-sex couples as well. For example, the government does not extend federal
employee and foreign-service benefits, described supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text,
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eligibility for federal marriage benefits might turn on whether their state of
domicile allowed them to marry—these federal benefits could still be
important for those same-sex couples living in the majority of states that do
not recognize their freedom to marry.
One might think of the Obama Administration’s efforts in this domain as
straddling two conflicting constitutional demands, both of which are
evident within the Holder letter. On the one hand, the Administration has
articulated its view that all discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
including but not limited to the lack of equal marriage rights, should be
subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. At the same time, however, the
Administration is committed to enforcing DOMA consistent with its
constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”33 While there is no way to harmonize perfectly these competing
constitutional commands, the Obama Administration has pursued a middleground strategy. Under the Administration’s DOMA enforcement policy,
the agency denies requests for family-based benefits from same-sex couples
with valid marriages, preserving judicial review over the question of
DOMA’s constitutionality.
Yet, by actively challenging the
constitutionality of DOMA section 3 in the pending litigation, the Obama
Administration is endeavoring to persuade the federal courts to accept its
to unmarried different-sex couples. See 74 Fed. Reg. 29,393 (June 17, 2009); 14 U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, supra note 20, § 511.3 (extending benefits explicitly and exclusively to “same-sex
domestic partners” of a federal employee and to a “spouse or . . . [same-sex] domestic
partner” of a foreign service employee). Other benefits apply regardless of sexual
orientation. The hospital visitation benefits, described supra note 22 and accompanying text,
for example, apply to both same- and different-sex couples. See 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511 (Apr.
15, 2010) (stating that the patient should have the right to designate visitors regardless of,
inter alia, sexual orientation or gender identity). Similarly, the interpretation of the FMLA
leave provisions, discussed supra note 26 and accompanying text, includes unmarried sameand different-sex couples. See Administrator’s Interpretation, No. 2010-3 (Dep’t of Labor
June 22, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FMLA/2010/
FMLAAI2010_3.htm (stating that the Act includes any adult who assumes obligations of a
parent, regardless of whether that adult has a legal relationship to the child). Along the same
lines, the rules issued by HUD and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, discussed supra
notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text, respectively, apply to same- and different-sex
couples. See 77 Fed. Reg. 5662, 5664 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 200,
203, 236, 400, 570, 574, 882, 891, 982) (providing that HUD-assisted or insured housing
inquiries would be made without regard to sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital
status); see also 77 Fed. Reg. at 18,144 (broadening the definition of “family” to encompass
“two adult individuals in a committed relationship wherein the partners share financial assets
and obligations, and are not married . . . ,” including couples in civil unions or domestic
partnerships). Finally, the memorandum issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services regarding B-2 Visas, discussed supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text, also
applies to both same- and opposite-sex couples. See Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Servs., supra note 30 (instructing officers to consider cohabitation,
regardless of the sex of either partner, as a “favorable factor” when granting extension of B-2
status). The issue of differential treatment—and the consistency of such policies with the
Obama Administration’s articulation of heightened judicial scrutiny for sexual-orientationbased classifications—could become increasingly relevant as same-sex couples secure the
right to marry in additional states.
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John
A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, supra note 6.
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heightened scrutiny argument,34 a position whose ripple effects could be
felt well beyond the context of DOMA section 3. In the meantime, the
Obama Administration pursues the middle ground of exercising interpretive
discretion—either by construing an existing statutory or regulatory category
to include same-sex partners,35 or by developing new rules that create a
category that did not previously exist that includes same-sex partners.36
III. DOMA AND ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Unlike the many areas of federal law where the Obama Administration,
by interpreting laws other than DOMA, can provide non-marriage-based
benefits to same-sex couples, the immigration context presents different,
and greater, obstacles to the executive’s use of discretion to promote the
rights of same-sex couples. The INA is replete with family-based benefits
that are specifically tied to marriage, making it impossible to interpret or
expand those statutory categories to same-sex couples without violating
DOMA. Consequently, DOMA prevents the executive branch from
providing virtually all family-based immigration benefits to the foreignborn spouses of U.S. citizens or LPRs based on their marriages, depriving
more than 28,500 U.S.-based binational same-sex couples,37 nearly half of
whom have children,38 access to a number of critical family-based
immigration benefits. Although the Administration cannot, consistent with
DOMA, provide family-based immigration benefits to foreign nationals
based on their marriages to U.S. citizens and LPRs, it is increasingly using
34. Shortly before this Article went to print, the Second Circuit invalidated DOMA
section 3 under a heightened scrutiny analysis in Windsor v. United States. Nos. 12-2335cv(L), 12-2435(Con.), 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012), aff’g 833 F. Supp. 2d 394
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-63 (U.S. July 16, 2012),
petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-307 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012). Windsor reflects
the first-ever federal appellate court decision applying heightened judicial scrutiny in the
context of LGBT rights.
35. In the federal benefits context, for example, President Obama directed federal
agencies to reinterpret the existing definitions of “family members” and “child” to include
same-sex domestic partners and the children of same-sex domestic partners, respectively.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on Extension of Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of
Federal Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,247 (June 2, 2010).
36. In the housing context, for example, HUD amended existing rules by promulgating
new regulations adding the categories “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to those
groups that were already included within the relevant HUD programs. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text; see also Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of
Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. at 5662–64.
37. For purposes of this discussion, a binational couple consists of one partner who is a
U.S. citizen or LPR and a second, foreign-national partner who is neither a U.S. citizen nor
an LPR. See Craig J. Konnoth & Gary J. Gates, Same-Sex Couples and Immigration in the
United States, WILLIAMS INST. 1 (Nov. 2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/Gates-Konnoth-Binational-Report-Nov-2011.pdf.
38. See Gary J. Gates, Bi-National Same-Sex Unmarried Partners in Census 2000: A
Demographic Portrait, WILLIAMS INST. 9 (Oct. 27, 2005), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.
edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-Binational-Report-Oct-2005.pdf (noting that approximately
46 percent of binational same-sex couples in the U.S. have children under age eighteen
living with them in their home).
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its discretion in immigration enforcement to spare foreign nationals in
binational same-sex couples some of the most severe consequences wrought
by DOMA. Specifically, immigration officials are exercising prosecutorial
discretion to prevent the foreign-born spouses and partners of U.S. citizens
from being removed from the United States.
A. Marriage Benefits Under Immigration Law
The INA provides a litany of family-based benefits for married couples.
These include permanent residence for noncitizen spouses,39 visas for
foreign-based fiancé(e)s,40 and waivers of bars to inadmissibility that
prevent foreign-national spouses from obtaining status as LPRs.41 DOMA
39. Cf. 8 U.S.C § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii)(I) (2006) (outlining procedures for granting
immigrant status for foreign-national spouses). Given that spousal immigration (in which a
U.S. citizen or an LPR sponsors a noncitizen for immigration benefits) accounts for 25
percent of all LPRs, DOMA’s impact on binational couples inside and outside the United
States cannot be overstated. See Cori K. Garland, Note, Say “I Do”: The Judicial Duty to
Heighten Constitutional Scrutiny of Immigration Policies Affecting Same-Sex Binational
Couples, 84 IND. L.J. 689, 702 (2009); see also RANDALL MONGER & JAMES YANKAY, DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2011, ANNUAL FLOW REPORT
(2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/LPR_FR_
2011.pdf.
Unlike the more highly favored U.S.-citizen-sponsored spousal petitions, which are
not subject to numerical limitations, see 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b), LPR-sponsored spousal
petitions are not accorded “immediate relative” status and are instead handled under familysponsored preference categories, which are subject to yearly quotas and multiyear backlogs.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)–(4) (listing order of preference categories, with “[s]pouses . . . of
permanent resident aliens” listed second). See also STUART ANDERSON, NAT’L FOUND. FOR
AM. POLICY, FAMILY IMMIGRATION: THE LONG WAIT TO IMMIGRATE 1 (2010) (noting a fouryear estimated minimum wait for spouses and minor children of LPRs). Moreover, those
foreign nationals who obtain LPR status independently of marriage do not qualify for
naturalization after three years, as in the case of LPRs in heterosexual marriages with U.S.
citizens. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1430 (allowing an LPR who is married to a U.S. citizen to naturalize
if the LPR, after obtaining LPR status, has, inter alia, lived in marital union with the U.S.
citizen and resided in the U.S. continuously for a period of three years). Without the
marriage benefit, it takes five years to naturalize. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427.
40. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i). This provision allows a U.S. citizen to sponsor his
or her fiancé(e) for entry into the United States as a nonimmigrant foreign national, provided
the couple met within two years of filing the petition and intend to marry within ninety days
of the arrival of the noncitizen fiancé(e). See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d)(1); see also Kerry Abrams,
Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1650–52 (2007)
(explaining the fiancé(e) visa and the limitations placed on these visas to avoid fraudulent
entry into the United States). In cases where the couple married abroad, the foreign-born
spouse can be sponsored for a K-3 visa. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 41.81 (2011).
41. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(d)(iv) (providing a waiver of inadmissibility due to
membership in a totalitarian party where the foreign national is the spouse of a U.S. citizen
or LPR, the foreign national is not a threat to national security, and the waiver would assure
family unity); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (providing a waiver of inadmissibility due to
unlawful presence in the United States to prevent “extreme hardship” to the U.S.-citizen or
LPR spouse of the foreign national); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(iii) (providing a waiver of the
ten-year inadmissibility period due to reentry or attempted reentry after an order of removal
if the foreign national experienced battery or extreme cruelty at the hands of a U.S.-citizen or
LPR spouse and there is a “connection” between the battery or extreme cruelty and the
foreign national’s removal, reentry, or attempted reentry); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11) (providing
a waiver of inadmissibility due to alien smuggling where the foreign national is already an
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prevents binational same-sex couples from obtaining any of these benefits
based on their marriage. In addition, DOMA makes the non-LPR foreignborn same-sex spouses of U.S. citizens prima facie ineligible for
cancellation of removal—an important defense to removal—unless the
foreign national can claim the relief based on a relationship with a U.S.
citizen or LPR parent or child.42 Finally, DOMA prevents nonimmigrant
foreign nationals who come to the U.S. temporarily from bringing their
same-sex spouses with them as a derivative of the principal’s visa
classification.43
Unless the foreign-national spouses can find an independent basis for
entering or remaining in the United States,44 these binational couples often
face untenable choices. They can try to relocate to a foreign country that
will recognize their relationship for immigration purposes45 or admit both
individuals independently of each other. But when a foreign national’s visa
reaches expiration, that individual must often make a choice between
leaving loved ones behind or remaining in the United States without lawful
status, which can subject the person to removal proceedings. Moreover, if

LPR or seeking admission or adjustment of status based on his or her U.S.-citizen or LPR
spouse; the foreign national smuggled or attempted to smuggle his or her then-spouse,
parent, or child into the United States; and waiver would assure family unity); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(12) (providing a waiver of inadmissibility due to certain specified civil penalties
involving civil fraud if the foreign national is already an LPR or seeking adjustment of status
based on his or her U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, has no prior civil penalties, committed the
civil fraud to support the immigration of a foreign national spouse or child, and waiver
would assure family unity); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g)(1) (providing a waiver of inadmissibility due
to a communicable disease of public health significance where the foreign national is the
spouse of a U.S. citizen or LPR); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (providing, subject to a few exceptions,
a waiver of inadmissibility due to various types of criminal activity to prevent “extreme
hardship” to the U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse of the foreign national); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)
(providing a waiver of inadmissibility due to misrepresentation to prevent “extreme
hardship” to the U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse of the foreign national).
42. In the case of non-permanent residents, cancellation relief is limited to those who
can establish, inter alia, “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen of the United States or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). A nonpermanent
resident who is granted cancellation of removal is granted an adjustment of status to that of
an LPR. See id.
43. Cf. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(d)(1), 1258(a) (2006) (allowing the spouse of a foreign
national to receive a visa to join the principal nonimmigrant foreign national in the United
States). But cf. supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (noting workarounds in which the
partners of nonimmigrants can obtain a visitor’s visa).
44. Foreign nationals most frequently obtain permanent residence through sponsorship
by a U.S.-citizen or LPR relative, or through an employer. See Visa Types for Immigrants,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1326.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2012). Other avenues, such as the diversity lottery or asylum, are less
common.
45. Citizens of the following countries can sponsor their partners for immigration
benefits: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland,
Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See Immigration Roundup, PARTNERS TASK FORCE
FOR GAY & LESBIAN COUPLES (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.buddybuddy.com/immigr.html.
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the foreign national leaves the country after falling out of status and then
tries to reenter, he or she could face as much as a ten-year bar to reentry.46
Despite the litany of statutory marriage-based benefits provided within
the immigration context, the executive branch retains the power to exercise
discretion not to assert the full scope of its enforcement authority in cases
that do not meet the agency’s enforcement priorities. Recently, foreign
nationals in same-sex marriages to U.S. citizens and LPRs have been the
recipients of favorable exercises of discretion in cases in which executive
branch officials have elected not to remove from the United States the
foreign-national same-sex spouses of U.S. citizens and LPRs. Presidential
administrations have for some time invoked such discretion not to prosecute
the immigration laws vigorously in categories of certain low-priority
cases,47 and, recently, officials have extended the same kind of discretion
on a case-by-case basis to many couples who, because of DOMA section 3,
cannot obtain a family-based immigration benefit based on their valid
marriage to a person of the same-sex. Hence, even though the Obama
Administration’s enforcement of DOMA section 3 means that it cannot
grant the same-sex foreign-born spouse of a U.S. citizen or LPR
immigration benefits (such as permanent residence) based on the marriage,
immigration officials have refrained from using the full scope of their
enforcement powers against such individuals in the removal context.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutorial discretion, a topic that has garnered significant attention of
late,48 concerns the authority of the immigration enforcement arm of the
executive branch not to assert the full scope of its powers of enforcement in
an individual case or category of cases.49 It is a function of the executive
46. Under the INA, any foreign national who is unlawfully present in the United States
for a period of more than 180 days but less than one year is subject to a bar on admission for
three years from the date of departure or removal; if the foreign national is unlawfully
present for one year or more, that individual is subject to a bar on admission for ten years
from the date of departure or removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (making
inadmissible any foreign national who “was unlawfully present in the United States for a
period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year . . . [who] again seeks admission within 3
years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal”); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)
(making inadmissible any foreign national who “has been unlawfully present in the United
States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of
such alien’s departure or removal”).
47. See generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009).
48. Most recently, attention has surrounded the Obama Administration’s policy to aid
youngsters who would have benefited from the proposed, but not passed, DREAM Act by
deferring action to remove certain youth who came to the United States as children. See infra
note 124 and accompanying text.
49. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to All Field
Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, ICE, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion], available at
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branch’s inherent law-enforcement authority and is driven by resource
constraints, diplomatic relationships, and humanitarian concerns.50 The
power to exercise prosecutorial discretion, while intrinsic to law
enforcement in both civil and criminal contexts, is given further meaning
under the broad powers the executive branch possesses in the field of
immigration.51 While prosecutorial discretion is not specifically mentioned
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
(defining prosecutorial discretion as the decision “not to assert the full scope of the
enforcement authority available to the agency in a given case”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FACT SHEET ON PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION GUIDELINES (2000) (“Prosecutorial discretion is the authority that every law
enforcement agency has to decide whether to exercise its enforcement powers against
someone.”); Memorandum from Bo Cooper, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., to Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., on INS Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion 3 (undated), available at http://shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretiomemo
cooper.pdf (“Because . . . the INS does not have the resources fully and completely to
enforce the immigration laws against every violator, it exercises prosecutorial discretion
thousands of times every day. INS enforcement priorities, including the removal of criminal
aliens and the deterrence of alien smuggling, are examples of discretionary enforcement
decisions on the broad, general level that focus INS enforcement resources in the areas of
greatest need.”); Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r of Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Reg’l Dirs., District Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents,
Reg’l and Dist. Counsel (Nov. 17, 2000).
Prosecutorial discretion—the decision whom to prosecute—should not be confused
with discretionary decisions to grant various forms of relief from removal (such as
cancellation of removal or asylum); whether an individual deserves an exception to certain
bars to eligibility, admissibility, or removability (for instance, whether an individual
applying for asylum more than one year past entry to the United States has demonstrated
“extraordinary” circumstances warranting an exception to the one-year deadline on asylum
claims); or requests for adjustment of status. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION
NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 231 (2007).
50. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) [hereinafter Wadhia,
Sharing Secrets]; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion]. As a fiscal matter, prosecutorial discretion saves money,
allowing the government to focus its efforts on the most serious offenders and those cases
that fall squarely within its enforcement priorities of “national security, border security,
public safety, and the integrity of the immigration system.” See Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion, supra note 49, at 2; see also Memorandum from Bo Cooper, supra note 49
(discussing the origins of prosecutorial discretion and its application in immigration
proceedings). The financial aspect is critical because the agencies that enforce immigration
law have the resources to remove annually fewer than 4 percent of those noncitizens living
in the United States without authorization. See Memorandum from John Morton, Director,
ICE, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to All ICE Employees, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 2,
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf.
As a humanitarian matter, moreover, many individuals in technical violation of civil
immigration laws are otherwise law-abiding and highly valuable members to society,
possessing important civic, religious, and family ties to U.S. citizens, corporations, and other
institutions. See Wadhia, Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 50, at 246 (discussing
the two-fold purpose of using prosecutorial discretion to conserve resources and promote
humanitarian concerns); see also Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 50, at 12–13 (listing
the humanitarian factors considered when officials grant favorable exercises of discretion).
51. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (“The Government
of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the
status of aliens.”). These vast decision-making powers in immigration are often referred to
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within the INA or immigration regulations, it has been recognized by the
Board of Immigration Appeals52 (BIA) and the federal courts,53 most
recently in Arizona v. United States,54 in which the Supreme Court noted
the importance of prosecutorial discretion in the broader scheme of
immigration enforcement.
As Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
observed, “A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion
exercised by immigration officials” who, “as an initial matter, must decide
whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”55
Immigration discretion spans a number of different stages of the
enforcement process—including the initiation of detainers, investigations,
and arrests; determinations regarding the commencement of removal
proceedings, appeals, and motions to reopen; and the execution of final

as the government’s “Plenary Powers” doctrine in immigration law. See, e.g., Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). Plenary Powers refers to the
political branches’ broad powers over immigration policy and the powers of Congress and
the executive branch to establish substantive immigration law for noncitizens, with
drastically curtailed judicial review. See id. at 547 (“In general the [Plenary Power] doctrine
declares that Congress and the executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority
over immigration decisions.”). While the doctrine has been heavily criticized, see, e.g.,
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power,
1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, it remains in force.
52. See, e.g., In re Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 110 (B.I.A. 2009) (noting DHS’s
prosecutorial discretion over deferred action and citing cases); In re Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec.
1381 (B.I.A. 2000) (finding that the legacy INS had prosecutorial discretion to decide
whether to commence removal proceedings against a particular individual subsequent to the
1996 immigration reforms).
53. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–92
(1999) (finding that the legacy INS retained inherent prosecutorial discretion as to whether
to bring removal proceedings).
54. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
55. See id. at 2499. Justice Kennedy went on to articulate the underlying policy reasons
for such broad discretion:
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human
concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example,
likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.
The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the
alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record
of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy
choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien to his
own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a
removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state
may be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring
conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon
return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the
Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this
Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.
Id. Justice Scalia, in dissent, indicted the Obama Administration for its June 15, 2012,
policy that would aid youngsters who came to the United States as children and would
benefit from passage of the DREAM Act. See id. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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orders of removal as well as decisions regarding detention and parole.56
Where prosecutorial discretion is concerned, three Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) subagencies exercise responsibility:
(1) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which includes a
complement of DHS trial attorneys who act as prosecutors before
immigration judges and the BIA and have the authority to make
recommendations to administratively close removal cases,57 as well as a
corps of on-the-ground officers who work on the frontline of enforcement,
including detention and removal, and who are oftentimes the last resort for
foreign nationals who seek to avoid the execution of a removal order;58
(2) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which is the
subagency charged with adjudicating nonadversarial affirmative petitions
and applications, such as marriage-based adjustment-of-status
applications,59 but which also may exercise prosecutorial discretion to, for
example, hold cases in abeyance or grant deferred action;60 and (3) U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is charged with borderrelated enforcement actions such as border patrol and airport inspections.61
Additionally, while officials within the DOJ—which houses the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), including the BIA and the cadre of
immigration judges who decide removal cases62—do not exercise
56. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters:
Federal Immigration
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819,
1826–43 (2011) (detailing the numerous stages when prosecutorial discretion is exercised).
57. See Office of the General Counsel, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/office-general-counsel (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). Administrative
closure is discussed infra at note 69.
58. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND:
TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS (2011), available at
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/tool-kit-for-prosecutors%20v.2%20linked%2005.02.11.pdf;
see
also Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/
overview/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
59. Adjustment of status is the process by which an eligible individual already in the
United States can obtain permanent resident status without having to return to his or her
country of origin to complete visa processing. See Adjustment of Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243
c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2da73a4107083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextcha
nnel=2da73a4107083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
60. Visa Retrogression, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=a294b16dedc0
f210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=aa290a5659083210VgnVCM10000
0082ca60aRCRD (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). For a discussion of deferred action, see infra
note 68 and accompanying text.
61. See About CBP, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012). CBP can exercise discretion regarding whether or not to bring
truncated, or so-called expedited removal proceedings for those caught attempting to enter
the United States. Those proceedings, as well as CBP’s exercise of discretion, are beyond
the scope of this Article.
62. The EOIR is composed of immigration courts, the Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which hears appeals of most
immigration decisions. This bifurcated system was created by the Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified at 6. U.S.C. § 101 (2006)), which
abolished the former Immigration and Naturalization Service and divided those
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prosecutorial discretion, they also possess various discretionary powers that
have been important in a number of cases involving binational same-sex
couples as well.63
1. DHS Discretion in Action
On June 17, 2011, ICE Director John Morton issued a memorandum that
specifically authorized immigration field officers to use prosecutorial
discretion and provided them with several criteria to guide the decision
whether to grant a favorable exercise of discretion in a particular case.64
These included a foreign national’s “ties and contributions to the
community, including family relationships,”65 and “whether the person has
a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or parent.”66 On August
18, 2011, the Obama Administration and DHS announced the creation of an
interagency committee to conduct a review of pending removal cases to
focus immigration enforcement on the priorities established in the Morton
memorandum.67 Since that time, various DHS officials have begun to use
their discretion in cases of binational same-sex couples, thereby sparing
them some of DOMA’s harshest consequences. First, in those cases in
which a noncitizen already has been placed in removal proceedings, the
government has agreed to favorable exercises of discretion by seeking to
close cases on the immigration court’s active docket. Second, in some
circumstances in which foreign nationals in binational same-sex
relationships were not facing removal proceedings but feared removal as
their status approached expiration, the government has provided a limited
reprieve by granting noncitizens “deferred action,” a temporary abatement
from immigration enforcement in cases where there are compelling

responsibilities among the DHS and DOJ. Under the Homeland Security Act, the adversarial
adjudicatory functions of immigration courts and the BIA are housed within DOJ and
overseen by the Attorney General. The prosecutorial and enforcement functions, as well as
the nonadversarial adjudicatory functions, are housed within DHS and are overseen by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 275, 291, 521; see also Margaret H.
Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional
Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 483–84 (2007).
63. See infra Part III.B.2.
64. See Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Letter from Janet Napolitano, Dir., U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to Sen. Dick
Durbin (Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=36684.
This review effort was intended to implement the goals stated in the Morton memorandum of
making more efficient use of limited resources to effect removals against those foreign
nationals with serious criminal records, who pose national security threats, or who are
egregious violators of immigration law. See Julia Preston, U.S. Issues Deportation Policy’s
First Reprieves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A15. As of June 2012, immigration officials
had reviewed more than 400,000 cases, exercising discretion not to pursue removal against
4,403 foreign nationals (less than 2 percent of the total number of cases). See Julia Preston,
Deportations Continue Despite U.S. Review of Backlog, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A13.
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humanitarian issues or a government interest at stake and the applicant is
considered a low priority for enforcement.68
a. Administrative Closure of Removal Proceedings
In several individual cases, immigration officials within DHS have
determined that, in light of the agency’s resource constraints, certain
removal proceedings against the foreign-born same-sex spouses of U.S.
citizens do not meet agency enforcement priorities and should be
administratively closed.69 In June 2011, for example, the government
moved to administratively close removal proceedings against Venezuelan
national Henry Velandia, who came to the United States in 2002 and, in
2010, married Josh Vandiver, a New Jersey resident.70 In August 2011, the
government also moved to administratively close removal proceedings
against Alex Benshimol, also from Venezuela and whose husband, Doug
Gentry, had unsuccessfully filed a marriage-based petition for immigrant
status for Benshimol in July 2010.71 (Judges agreed to administratively
close both cases.72) In each case, DHS trial attorneys originally balked at a
favorable exercise of discretion, prompting the immigration judge to grant
long continuances so that the agency could reconsider.73

68. See OFFICE OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., DEFERRED ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND
CONSISTENCY IN THE USCIS PROCESS 2 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/cisomb-combined-dar.pdf (“When accorded deferred action, an individual is
able to remain, temporarily, in the United States: USCIS declines to exercise its authority to
issue a Notice to Appear and does not place the individual in removal proceedings.”). A
Notice to Appear is the charging document that initiates removal proceedings. A grant of
deferred action does not constitute permanent residence or confer legal status; rather, it is a
promise not to bring removal proceedings for a specified period of time (usually one or two
years). TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 58, at 4.
69. Administrative closure is a device to remove a case temporarily from an immigration
judge’s active calendar (or from the BIA’s docket). See In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688,
692–95 (B.I.A. 2012). Administrative closure is not the same thing as a termination or
conclusion of immigration proceedings; when a case is administratively closed, either the
government or the respondent to the proceedings can move to have the case re-calendared
before the judge (or to reinstate an appeal before the BIA). See id. at 695. Administrative
closure is not unique to immigration; rather, it is a standard feature of federal civil
procedure. See, e.g., St. Marks Place Hous. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
610 F.3d 75, 80–81 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
70. See Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings Against Immigrant in SameSex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A16.
71. See Chris Geidner, Immigration Judge Closes Deportation Case Against Married
Gay Man, METROWEEKLY (Aug. 20, 2011, 1:25 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/
poliglot/2011/08/immigration-judge-closes-depor.html. Benshimol remained after his visitor
status expired in 2009, see Seth Hammelgram, CA Couple Fights Deportation, EDGE S.F.
(July 7, 2011), http://www.edgesanfrancisco.com/news/local/121962/ca_couple_fights_
deportation, causing him to face a ten-year bar to applying for reentry. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text (discussing bars to reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) for foreign
nationals who accumulate unlawful presence).
72. See Semple, supra note 70; Geidner, supra note 71.
73. See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
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Later that year, government attorneys took similar action in at least two
additional cases. In November 2011, the government filed a motion to
administratively close removal proceedings against Monica Alcota, an
Argentine national who lives in Queens, N.Y., with her U.S.-citizen wife,
Cristina Ojeda.74 One month later, it moved to administratively close
removal proceedings against Michael Thomas, a citizen of Trinidad and
Tobago who in 2010 married his American spouse, John Brandoli, in
Massachusetts.75 Immigration judges granted motions to administratively
close both cases.
b. Deferred Action
In a few other cases, officials within USCIS have granted deferred action
to foreign nationals who could face removal proceedings despite being
validly married to U.S. citizens. One such case involved Australian
national Anthony John Makk, who is married to Bradford Wells, an
American who is suffering from AIDS-related complications.76 The
couple, who have been together for nineteen years and married for seven
years, faced the possibility of separation as Makk’s status reached
expiration.77 Makk’s application for permanent residence as Wells’s
spouse was denied in August 2011.78 On the heels of a media campaign
that included pleas by members of Congress, USCIS granted Makk deferred
action for two years beginning on January 4, 2012.79 Similarly, on May 22,
2012, after similar pleas from members of Congress, USCIS granted
deferred action to Japanese immigrant Takako Ueda, who married U.S.
citizen Frances Herbert in 2011.80 The government also provided Tim
Smulian, a South African national married to Edwin Blesch, a U.S. citizen,
a one-year grant of deferred action.81 Blesch and Smulian are plaintiffs in
74. See id.; see also Michael Bowman, U.S. Immigration Judge Suspends Deportation
for Gay Spouse, VOICE OF AMERICA (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/content/usimmigration-judge-suspends-deportation-of-gay-spouse-118741179/174610.html.
75. See Officials Agree to Close Deportation Case Involving Gay Binational Couple,
ADVOCATE (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2011/12/16/
officials-agree-close-deportation-case-involving-gay-binational-couple.
The request for
prosecutorial discretion had previously been denied. See Maria Sacchetti, Two Reprieves
Give Immigrants Cautious Hope, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2011, at A1.
76. See Carolyn Lochhead, Deportation Threat Lifted from S.F. Gay Spouse, SFGATE
(Jan. 5, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Deportation-threat-liftedfrom-S-F-gay-spouse-2442468.php.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Press Release, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Anthony John Makk and
Bradford Wells (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2012/
01/pelosi-statement-on-anthony-john-makk-and-bradford-wells.shtml.
80. See Deportation Threat Lifted for Lesbian Vt. Couple, FOXNEWS.COM (May
22, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/05/22/deportation-threat-lifted-for-lesbian-vtcouple/.
81. See Miranda Leitsinger, Gay Couples, Where Spouse is Foreigner, Sue Over DOMA,
NBCNEWS.COM (Apr. 3, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/04/
03/11004440-gay-couples-where-spouse-is-a-foreigner-sue-over-doma?lite.
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one of a number of federal-court challenges brought by binational couples
affected by DOMA.82
2. DOJ Discretion in Action
Shortly after the Obama Administration’s February 23, 2011,
announcement to enforce but not defend DOMA section 3, the Attorney
General issued a precedential immigration ruling in Matter of Dorman83
that already has had cascading effects in a number of cases concerning
binational same-sex couples. Dorman involved a British citizen who
entered the United States in 1996, overstayed his nonimmigrant status, and
subsequently entered into a New Jersey same-sex civil union84 with a U.S.
citizen partner in 2009.85 Upon being placed in removal proceedings,
Dorman sought a form of discretionary relief from removal known as
cancellation of removal that, if granted, would result in LPR status.86 In
order to be eligible for that relief, Dorman would have to demonstrate
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative,
which the INA defines as a U.S. citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child.87
The immigration judge flatly denied Dorman’s request for cancellation of
removal relief on the grounds that his same-sex partner was not a qualifying
relative, and the BIA affirmed that holding.88 Dorman appealed that
decision by filing a petition for review of his final order of removal in the
Third Circuit, but the case was returned to the agency when the Attorney
General invoked a procedure, used sparingly in immigration law, of
certifying the BIA’s decision to himself and remanding the action to the
BIA for reconsideration.89
82. See Complaint, Blesch v. Holder, No. 12-1578 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2012); see also
Revelis v. Napolitano, 844 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Lui v. Holder, No: 2:11-CV01267-SVW (JCGx) (C.D. Cal. dismissed Feb. 22, 2012); Complaint, Aranas v. Napolitano,
No. SACV12-1137-JVS(MLGx) (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2012). Two other cases, TorresBarragan v. Holder, No. 10-55768 (9th Cir. dismissed Apr. 10, 2012), and In re Dorman, 25
I. & N. Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011), were resolved without any ruling regarding DOMA’s
constitutionality. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Torres-Barragan on the petitioner’s voluntary
motion after his case was remanded to the agency, where it was administratively closed, see
Order, Torres-Barragan, No. 10-55768 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012), ECF No. 39, and Dorman
was certified to the Attorney General, remanded to the BIA, and eventually ordered
administratively closed by the immigration court. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying
text.
83. See Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 485; see also Protecting and Preserving the Rights
of LGBT Families: DOMA, Dorman, and Immigration Strategies, LEGAL ACTION CENTER
(June 13, 2011), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/DOMA-RemovalProceedings-6-13-2011.pdf.
84. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-1 (West 2012). New Jersey does not currently allow samesex couples to marry. See supra note 2.
85. Dorman, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 485.
86. For an explanation of cancellation of removal, see supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006).
88. Dorman, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 485.
89. Id. The Attorney General has broad authority to certify to himself and review de
novo BIA decisions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2011) (allowing the Attorney General, the
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The Attorney General ordered the BIA to consider four questions
spanning a range of issues: (1) whether Dorman could be considered a
“spouse” under New Jersey law; (2) whether, absent the requirements of
DOMA, Dorman’s same-sex partnership or civil union would qualify him
to be considered a “spouse” under the INA; (3) what impact, if any, the
timing of Dorman’s civil union should have on his request for discretionary
relief; and (4) whether, assuming Dorman had a “qualifying relative,” he
would be able to satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
standard for cancellation of removal.90 While it is difficult to comprehend
how the executive branch could provide a marriage-based benefit to a samesex spouse or domestic partner while still enforcing DOMA,91 the Attorney
General’s remand order has provided Dorman a critical reprieve from
removal: after his case was remanded to the BIA and, in turn, remanded to
the immigration judge, the government moved to have the case
administratively closed.92
For some time, Dorman was a crucial resource for attorneys seeking a
favorable exercise of DHS discretion in their clients’ removal
proceedings.93 Following the decision, the BIA relied on it to remand at
least five cases in which a U.S. citizen had filed a marriage-based visa
petition for a same-sex spouse. In four of the cases, the USCIS Field Office
Director denied the visa petitions, determining in each case that the
marriage did not constitute a valid spousal relationship in light of DOMA
section 3.94 All four cases were appealed from USCIS to the BIA. The
fifth case, a removal proceeding, involved a motion to reopen before the
BIA in light of a pending visa petition filed by the respondent’s same-sex
Secretary of DHS, the Chairman of the BIA or a majority of the BIA to refer the latter’s
decisions to the Attorney General for review); see also Taylor, supra note 62, at 483–84 &
n.35 (discussing the process for certifying decisions to the Attorney General). This
certification power, though sparingly used, is a powerful tool in that it allows the Attorney
General to pronounce new standards for the agency and overturn longstanding BIA
precedent. See Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need For Procedural Safeguards
in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1766 (2010).
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006) (requiring that removal of foreign-born
individual would cause “exceptional and unusual hardship requirement” to a U.S.-citizen
spouse, parent, or child).
91. See Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (applying the definition of
marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman” to “the meaning of any Act of
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus
and agencies of the United States”).
92. Case on file with the Fordham Law Review; see James O’Shea, Gay Undocumented
Irishman Has His Deportation Suspended, IRISH CENT. (July 20, 2012, 10:30 AM),
http://www.irishcentral.com/news/Gay-married-illegal-Irishman-has-his-deportationsuspended--163155386.html. The government sought administrative closure after the couple
married in New York. Email from Nicholas Mundy, Esq., Counsel to Dorman, to author
(Aug. 29, 2012, 11:28 EST) (on file with author).
93. Dorman was especially important prior to the issuance of formal DHS guidelines
providing for prosecutorial discretion in the cases of binational same-sex couples. See infra
note 113 and accompanying text.
94. Cases on file with the Fordham Law Review.
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U.S. citizen spouse.95 The government did not contest the bona fides of the
marriage on appeal but opposed any reopening on grounds that the
adjustment-of-status application96 was barred by DOMA.
In the first four appeals originating within USCIS, the BIA remanded the
cases to the agency in light of Dorman and directed USCIS to determine the
validity of the marriages under state law and whether, absent the
requirements of DOMA, each beneficiary would be considered a “spouse”
under the INA.97 In the fifth case, the BIA, also citing Dorman, ordered the
case reopened and remanded the matter to the immigration judge to
determine the validity of the marriage under state law and whether, absent
the requirements of DOMA and assuming the immediate availability of an
immigrant visa, the beneficiary would be considered a “spouse” under the
INA.98
Another important aspect of enforcement discretion involves cases in
which immigration judges, exercising their discretion on behalf of the
Attorney General,99 have administratively closed proceedings or delayed
them for long periods. In one case originating out of Denver, Colorado,100
an immigration judge administratively closed removal proceedings despite
DHS’s opposition by relying on a recent BIA ruling clarifying the
discretionary power of immigration judges to administratively close
proceedings.101 Although the DHS trial attorney opposed removing the
case from the immigration judge’s active docket, the judge, citing Dorman,
ordered the case administratively closed pending Dorman’s resolution.102
In other cases, including many in which requests by DHS trial attorneys for
administrative closure were eventually forthcoming, immigration judges
granted continuances for months, if not years, so that the government could
95. Case on file with the Fordham Law Review.
96. For an explanation of adjustment of status, see supra note 59.
97. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
98. These BIA orders were issued very recently, and thus it remains to be seen how,
exactly, they will be resolved. However, assuming that all of these beneficiaries would be
considered lawful spouses in the absence of DOMA, it is hard to see how the petitions could
be granted as long as section 3 remains in force.
99. Immigration Judges are appointed by the Attorney General and delegated the
responsibility to act on the Attorney General’s behalf. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2006); see
also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.31 (2011) (“Subject to any specific limitation prescribed by the Act and
this chapter, immigration judges shall also exercise the discretion and authority conferred
upon the Attorney General . . . as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such
cases.”).
100. Case on file with the Fordham Law Review.
101. See In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012) (establishing a six-factor test
under which immigration judges can administratively close proceedings).
102. On October 1, 2012, an immigration judge in Charlotte, North Carolina, granted a
motion to administratively close removal proceedings in the case of a foreign national whose
only basis for relief from removal was an adjustment of status based on his marriage to a
U.S. citizen. The couple had been in a committed relationship for more than nine years
when they married in Vermont on September 10, 2012. Email from Helen Parsonage, Esq.,
to author (Oct. 1, 2012, 17:36 EST) (on file with author). Like many other foreign-national
same-sex spouses of U.S. citizens, DOMA remains the only impediment to the foreign
national’s ability to obtain permanent residence.
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reconsider a favorable exercise of discretion. In Alex Benshimol’s case,103
for example, the immigration judge ruled initially that the case would be
continued for twenty-six months unless the government agreed to a
favorable exercise of discretion, and, in response, the DHS trial attorney
asked the immigration judge to administratively close the case.104 Henry
Velandia,105 during his proceedings, received a seven-month continuance
before his case was administratively closed on the government’s motion.106
C. Enforcement Discretion and Constitutional Commands
Cases in which DHS officials have agreed to a favorable exercise of
discretion, and the analogous uses of discretion in similar cases by officials
within DOJ, address a conundrum that became apparent after the Obama
Administration announced that it would no longer defend section 3 in court:
although the Administration understood its Take Care obligations107 to
require it to comply with DOMA section 3 so long as it remained good
law,108 it seemed wrongheaded to remove from the United States spouses of
U.S. citizens and LPRs who, but for DOMA—a law the Obama
Administration not only believed to be unconstitutional but was actively
challenging in court—would be eligible for permanent residence. Under a
DOMA enforcement policy, USCIS cannot grant family-based immigration
benefits to the same-sex foreign-born spouses of U.S. citizens and LPRs
based on a valid marriage, but it can use its enforcement discretion to
prevent the foreign national from removal, sparing binational couples some
of the most serious consequences resulting from DOMA’s requirement that
the government not recognize the marriage for purposes of federal
marriage-based benefits.
For some time, Obama Administration officials stated,109 but refused to
put in writing, a policy of including same-sex relationships within the
definition of the “family relationships” officials would consider when
granting favorable exercises of discretion.110 After members of Congress
103. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
104. See Dan Schreiber, Case of Gay Couple Facing Deportation Gets Two-Year Delay,
S.F. EXAMINER (July 13, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/07/casegay-couple-facing-deportation-gets-two-year-delay.
105. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
106. See Adriana Hauser, Federal Authorities Drop Deportation Case Against SameSex Partner, CNN (June 30, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-30/us/new.jersey.
deportation.case_1_deportation-process-lavi-soloway-gay-couples?_s=PM:US.
107. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
109. See Robert Pear, Fewer Youths To Be Deported in New Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2011, at A1.
110. For example, DHS would state in writing only that “LGBT individuals’ ties and
contributions to the community” constituted “one factor relevant to determining whether a
case is a low priority.” See Letter from Nelson Peacock, Assistant Sec’y, Office of
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Congressman Jerrold Nadler, U.S.
House of Representatives (Oct. 25, 2011) (emphasis added) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
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made repeated requests that the Obama Administration put the policy in
writing to “increase awareness of DHS’s position on this issue among DHS
staff, adjudicators, the immigration bar, and affected individuals,”111 DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano announced on September 27, 2012, that she
would “direct[] ICE to disseminate written guidance to the field that . . .
‘family relationships’ includes long-term, same-sex partners.”112 That
guidance, issued on October 5, 2012,113 is important because it removes any
doubt that the same-sex foreign-national partners of U.S. citizens and LPRs
(married or not) are eligible for favorable exercises of discretion, ensuring
that no unnecessary obstacle prevents DHS from exercising discretion in
worthy cases of binational couples.
To be sure, these favorable exercises of discretion are a second-best
solution. After all, they do not actually constitute a substantive immigration
benefit for binational same-sex couples; they are merely a reprieve, either
by staving off removal proceedings or, where those proceedings are already
initiated, by taking those cases off the immigration court’s active docket.
Still, enforcement discretion provides the Obama Administration with a
way of negotiating its dual commitments to equal protection and the faithful
execution of the laws. It also promotes the Obama Administration’s
broader goal of having a coordinate branch of government provide the
decisive vote on DOMA’s enforceability.

111. See Letter from Nancy Pelosi et al., Democratic Leader, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 31, 2011)
(asking that DHS recognize, in writing, “the ties of a same-sex partner or spouse as a
positive factor for discretionary relief in immigration enforcement deportation cases”) (on
file with author); see also Chris Geidner, Pelosi Presses White House on Immigration for
Gay Couples, BUZZFEED POL. (Aug. 1, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
chrisgeidner/pelosi-presses-white-house-on-immigration-for-gay (noting a renewed effort by
members of Congress to persuade the Obama Administration to put in writing its
commitment to include binational same-sex couples within its prosecutorial discretion
policy). Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, and James Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Chief Counsel, and All Special Agents in Charge,
on Applicability of Prosecutorial Discretion Memoranda to Certain Family Relationships
(Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2012/10/9-Oct12-PD-and-Family-Reltionships.pdf.
112. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Jerrold
Nadler, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 27, 2012), available at http://
www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2012/09/12-3384-Nadler-S1-Signed-Response09.27.12.pdf; see Julia Preston, Same-Sex Couples Granted Protection in Deportations, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at A15.
113. Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, and James Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Chief Counsel, and All Special Agents in Charge,
on Applicability of Prosecutorial Discretion Memoranda to Certain Family Relationships
(Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2012/10/9-Oct12-PD-and-Family-Reltionships.pdf.
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IV. EXECUTIVE DISCRETION, LEGISLATIVE COMMANDS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
The Obama Administration’s commitment to exercising discretion in
furtherance of same-sex couples, both through interpretive discretion and
enforcement discretion, is consistent with its broader efforts to use
executive branch authority to further LGBT equality more generally.114
Indeed, both forms of discretion reflect ways that the President can promote
a civil-rights agenda through administrative action during periods in which
it is difficult to move legislation through Congress.115 These forms of
discretion also illustrate different aspects of the relationship between
executive branch constitutional interpretation and legislative change. While
a full account of that topic will be saved for future scholarship,116 a few
points are worth mentioning here.
One difference between interpretive and enforcement discretion in their
respective implementations is that, while most of the initiatives involving
interpretive discretion had been put in place prior to the Attorney General’s
announcement that the Administration would no longer defend DOMA
section 3 in court,117 the Administration did not begin to exercise
enforcement discretion in immigration cases involving binational same-sex
couples until after the DOMA announcement.118 Moreover, while both
interpretive and enforcement discretion apply to same-sex couples
regardless of marital status, it is noteworthy that all of the recent cases of
enforcement discretion reported in the press and discussed in this Article
involve only married couples. While Dorman involved a couple with a
New Jersey civil union, it was only after the couple married in New York
that DHS agreed to a favorable exercise of discretion.119 However, to the
extent that a foreign national’s marital status appeared to be an important
factor in obtaining a favorable exercise of discretion, the relevant ICE
114. See Nosanchuk, supra note 21, at 444–46, 456–57, 459–63 (detailing the Obama
Administration’s broad record of executive branch action in furtherance of LGBT equality).
115. President Obama has expressed his support for the Respect for Marriage Act, which
would repeal DOMA. H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 598, 112th Cong. (2011). See
David Nakamura, Obama Backs Bill to Repeal Defense of Marriage Act, WASH. POST, July
19, 2011, at A3.
116. See Joseph Landau, The President and the Passive Virtues:
Executive
Constitutionalism and Individual Rights (Sept. 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
117. Indeed, at least one such policy dates as far back as 1993, when the legacy INS first
indicated that it would extend some immigration benefits to same-sex couples. See supra
note 29 and accompanying text.
118. Although the pre-2011 prosecutorial discretion memos reference family ties as a
factor for prosecutorial discretion, see, e.g., Meissner, supra note 49, at 7, that factor likely
was not as important then as it is now. As a general matter, the “family ties” factor was a
subset of the broader category of “humanitarian concerns,” not the independent factor that it
is today. More importantly, however, it was not until very recently that the Administration
articulated, orally or in writing, that it would include same-sex couples within the definition
of “family” contemplated by its prosecutorial discretion guidelines. See supra notes 109–13
and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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guidelines120—including the October 5, 2012, guidance for binational
same-sex couples121—clarify that a foreign national need not be married to
a U.S. citizen or LPR to be eligible for prosecutorial discretion.
It is also worth noting that, where binational same-sex couples are
concerned, the Obama Administration is pursuing a case-by-case approach,
considering one couple at a time, and refusing to put in place mechanisms
for the types of across-the-board relief “to the entire category of cases
affected by DOMA”122 that have been used in other contexts. As a practical
matter, the Obama Administration’s case-by-case approach requires
binational same-sex couples to go to great lengths to persuade government
officials, including DHS trial attorneys—their litigation adversaries in
removal proceedings—to grant a favorable exercise of discretion, which can
require protracted litigation as well as efforts and interventions by
legislators, advocacy organizations, and the media.
The Obama
Administration’s more measured approach to binational same-sex couples
is distinguishable from other executive branch policies, including some by
prior presidential administrations, to grant favorable exercises of discretion
in entire categories of deserving cases. The Obama Administration’s recent
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy, for example,
defers action for the entire category of eligible young people who came to
the United States as children. While the source of DACA is the same June
2011 memorandum by John Morton that has been applied to cases of
foreign-born same-sex partners of U.S. citizens,123 binational same-sex
couples must pursue relief on a case-by-case basis, while DACA provides
across-the-board relief.124
120. See Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 4.
121. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
122. See Chris Geidner, DOJ Denies Any “Policy” on DOMA-Impacted Cases at
Immigration Appeals Board, METROWEEKLY (July 3, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://
www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/07/doj-denies-any-policy-on-doma-impactedimmigra.html; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
123. Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 49, at 4 (listing criteria for granting
favorable exercises of discretion that include whether the foreign national “came to the
United States as a young child” or is “pursui[ng] education in the United States, with
particular consideration given to those who have graduated from a U.S. high school or have
successfully pursued or are pursuing a college or advanced degrees at a legitimate institution
of higher education in the United States”).
124. To be eligible for deferred action, which, under DACA, includes guaranteed
employment authorization, the individual must be at least fifteen years old (individuals in
removal proceedings, or who have a final removal or voluntary departure order may apply
even if they are younger than fifteen) and must also: (1) have been under the age of sixteen
when brought to the United States and have been under the age of thirty-one as of June 15,
2012; (2) have continuously resided, and currently reside, within the United States between
June 15, 2007, and the present time; (3) have been physically present in the United States on
June 15, 2012, and at the time of making the request; (4) have entered without inspection
before June 15, 2012, or fell out of lawful immigration status as of June 15, 2012; (5) be
currently in school, have graduated from high school, have obtained a general education
certificate, or be an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the
United States; and (6) have not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant
misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise pose a threat to national
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It is conceivable that DOMA’s standing in the federal courts could have
an effect upon how the Obama Administration chooses to implement its
prosecutorial discretion policy for binational same-sex couples. During the
past fourteen months, federal courts have struck down section 3 of DOMA
eight times, with more rulings likely to follow.125 Perhaps the Obama
Administration will consider changing its policy from a case-by-case
approach to a categorical one if additional federal courts invalidate DOMA
section 3. In the meantime, these positive acts of executive branch
discretion remain a critical stopgap that can greatly lessen some of the most
severe harms wrought by DOMA.
CONCLUSION
While DOMA section 3 creates a federal definition of the words
“marriage” and “spouse,” it is not an absolute bar to extending federal
benefits to same-sex couples. Nor does section 3 impede the ordinary
discretion with which federal agencies carry out their delegations. Hence,
the Obama Administration has, consistent with DOMA, found ways of
providing benefits to same-sex couples in certain circumstances and
protecting binational same-sex couples from harm in other circumstances.
security and public safety. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=f2ef2f19470f7310VgnVCM10
0000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=f2ef2f19470f7310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012); see also Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.,
Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir.,
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
125. Windsor v. United States, Nos. 12-2335-cv(L), 12-2435(Con.), 2012 WL 4937310
(2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012), aff’g 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), petition for cert. before
judgment filed, No. 12-63 (U.S. July 16, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No.
12-307 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012);Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), aff’g Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass.
2010), and Massachusetts. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.
Mass. 2010), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 12-13 (U.S. June 29, 2012), 12-15 (U.S. July 3,
2012), and 12-97 (U.S. July 20, 2012); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009);
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:10-cv-1750 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012), appeal filed,
No. 12-3273 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-231
(U.S. Aug. 21, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-302 (U.S. Sept. 11,
2012); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. C 10-1564 CW, 2012 WL 1909603
(N.D. Cal. May 24, 2012), appeal filed, No. 12-16461 (9th Cir. June 26, 2012), and No. 1216628 (9th Cir. July 23, 2012); Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D.
Cal. 2012), appeal filed, No. 12-15388 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2012), and No. 12-15409 (9th Cir.
Feb. 28, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012). But
see In Chambers Order re Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss; Intervenor’s Motion to
Dismiss, Lui v. Holder, No: 2:11-cv-01267-SVW-JCG (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011), ECF No.
38 (upholding DOMA); In Chambers Order re Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, TorresBarragan v. Holder, No. 2:09-cv-08564-RGK-MLG (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2010), ECF No. 24
(same). DOMA also has been struck down in the bankruptcy context. See In re Balas, 449
B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); In re Somers, 448 B.R. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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The Obama Administration’s use of its considerable discretion in the
interpretation and enforcement of federal law reflects important ways of
engaging its constitutional doubt regarding DOMA section 3 while
promoting a civil-rights agenda in the absence of new federal legislation.

